The Statesman (Texts in the History of Political Though… (2024)

Δεν σταματάει να με εκπλήσσει η ανακάλυψη όλων και περισσότερων αντανακλάσεων της σκέψης του Πλάτωνα στη νεωτερική και σύγχρονη συγκρότητη της κυριαρχίας.

Ο Πλάτων στην Πολιτεία εκθέτει τις απόψεις του για την πολιτική, ενώ στον Πολιτικό προσεγγίζει το θέμα από την πλευρά των πολιτών.

Statesman lacks the mystery of Theaetetus and the rigor of Sophist, but it is the natural conclusion to the trilogy. The first dialogue is a critique of Protagoras and Heracl*tus, a careful examination of the faults of relativism. The second dialogue is a critique of Parmenides and the faults of monism. Statesman demonstrates that neither one accurately describes practical human existence, which is ultimately a weaving together of both interpretations. The difficulty is that the two interpretations contradict each other in a very fundamental way, which to my mind calls into question the entire approach. The Stranger is no Socrates, who would no doubt have serious issues with the contradictions inherent in this weaving. But where the Stranger is successful is in outlining these competing schools of thought, both of which have their merits -- and perhaps that was Plato's goal here, or at least one of his goals.

The Brann/Kalkavage/Salem translation is clear and consistent. One of the best things about the Focus Philosophical translations is that nearly all of them include glossaries, so the reader can see how the translators choose to translate particular words, in this case with explanations why. The interpretive essay is also very good, though perhaps not entirely necessary.

عجائب لا تنقضي عند أفلاطون

Wacky divisions, fun conclusions. Non-philosophers should just obey the rules. Politics isn't a science. Politicians are blowhards.

Seth Benardete's translation of Plato's Statesman is the translation any student of Plato (who lacks full knowledge of Greek) should make primary use of. His translation is the most literal one, and Benardete's mastery of Greek and his faithfulness to the particulars of the original make it the translation one should have at hand when paying the closest attention to Plato's particulars. In addition to the dialogue itself, Benardete's accompanying commentary can be the source of profound insights for those willing to expend the necessary effort needed to penetrate it (which, as I've said elsewhere, will come as no surprise to readers of Benardete's other works). One last thing I would like to point out: this is the third part of a three-part work which was originally published in one volume— The Being of the Beautiful. Each of the three parts were later published separately, and in each of those three individual parts there is one introduction that briefly discusses all three of the dialogues in the whole trilogy (Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman). But note: this three-part introduction is not included in the original Being of the Beautiful. But also, note this as well: the introduction that is in The Being of the Beautiful is not the same as the introduction in each of its later, separately published parts. Serious students may want to read both.

Review:

November 2004

Plato's most disturbing political dialogue

This book, the culmination of Benardete's masterful translation of what Jacob Klein was pleased to call `Plato's Trilogy,' includes not only a translation of `The Statesman' but also a superb commentary with notes. (Benardete, btw, is something of a rarity these days, a `non-political' student of Leo Strauss.' This `trilogy' (as Klein would say) in question consists of 3 dialogues; Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman. But, as Benardete points out, the Sophist and Statesman belong together as a pair. The singular appearance of the Eleatic Stranger - some translate `Stranger' as Visitor - and the near silence of our Socrates, the inability (or unwillingness) of Plato to give us a third dialogue (as seemingly `promised' at 217a) called `The Philosopher,' all this points to the unique pairing of Sophist and Statesman. Benardete also points out that these 2 dialogues are the only ones with specific and "explicit allusions" to each other.

In turning away from the Sophist and turning towards the Statesman we are leaving the rarefied heights (and obscure depths) of theory, and its imitators, for the `lowly' everyday world of political/social life. Indeed this `turn' can perhaps be said to be foreshadowed in the Sophist (at 247e) when the Stranger makes a remarkably `Nietzschean' definition, "I'm proposing, in short, a definition (boundary mark): `The things which are' are not anything but power." Being as Power! Plato is not Nietzsche, however. Plato always hedges. The `proposal' is perhaps only made to convince some so-called `improved' materialists to leave their `artless' materialism. But later, when speaking to some `friends of the forms,' who are `idealists' like Socrates, the logic of this dialectic forces the Stranger (249a) to say, "But, by Zeus, what of this? Shall we easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and intelligence are truly not present to that which perfectly is, and its not even living, not even thinking, but august and pure, without mind, it stands motionless." Thus materialists and Idealists are `forced' to concede that being is the ability to affect and be affected.

Later, at 249c-d, the Stranger will speak of this arrangement in such a manner that it reminds us of compromise between two warring parties. But compromise, and the seeming impossibility of enduring compromise, brings us towards the very heart of the Statesman. Socrates is going to die. (It is tragically fitting, perhaps almost necessary, that Benardete ends the final installment of his commentary on the Triptych Theaetetus/Sophist/Statesman with the words "Socrates is about to go on trial.") Death, the threat of death, hovers above these pages as it does around political life. "The Statesman is more profound than the Sophist" Benardete (p III.142) correctly reminds us. It is profound for several reasons. Benardete brings at this point to our attention just one: "Virtue consists in the strife of the beautiful with the beautiful." The metaphor/image/standard for morality in the Sophist - health - is replaced in the Statesman by beauty. ...Perhaps it is true that `we have beauty so we don't die of the truth' as Nietzsche somewhere remarked. But he fails to mention that we now die of beauty instead of truth.

The two types of beauty that are at war are courage and moderation. "Dialectics, it seems, is the practice of resolving the strife between moderation and courage." Benardete, I think correctly, indicates there is, and can be, no final reconciliation between them. Indeed, it seems there is no natural mean between them. "Nature might herself be neutral, but her apparitions are always skewed and cluster around either one of two partial kinds." Men and women are emblematic images of courage and moderation, the ever-present reminder that they can never simply be the same.

But the City can, in theory, also be either moderate or courageous. A city of the first sort, "moved by the spirit of accommodation, such a city ends up enslaved, its unwilled and inadvertent cowardice hardly separable from its stupidity." A city of the second type, "in contrast, looks at every other city as its enemy. Its' insight is too keen. The otherness of the stranger [foreigner] is for it so absolute that it must be constantly engaged in war, until it brings upon itself either its enslavement or destruction." This last, the beautiful error of courage, could only not be an error if the courageous city never lost. "The Stranger disregards the possibility that such a city might never fail and thus achieve a universal empire." But this is the beautiful modern dream of Kojeve and his universal hom*ogenous state; it is not the dream of the Stranger or, I think, Benardete and Plato.

Not that a universal state is, for Benardete at least, impossible. "But apart from the difficulty that it [the courageous city] would then be forced to turn against itself if it were not to give up its own nature, the myth [of the Reversed Cosmos, 268e] has taught us that God alone is capable of universal rule, and even he is periodically forced to abandon control. Excessive moderation then, is more a danger to the city than the hubris of courage. The nature of things is more disposed to check the tyranny of a part over the whole than the enslavement of a part to a part. We perhaps might believe that the Stranger in this regard is a shade too hopeful." It seems that while Benardete thinks the Universal State, ala Kojeve, is technically possible, it would be a calamity. It would not be entirely an exaggeration if we were to observe that the major difference between `non-political' or philosophical Straussians and those Straussians actively involved in politics is that the latter no longer believe that the Universal State is necessarily a calamity.

Be that as it may, Benardete points out that while the city executes, exiles or disgraces those courageous natures that oppose it, the moderate it merely enslaves. This only seems, btw, to contradict what Benardete said earlier about moderation being a greater danger. The greater danger to the city qua city is moderation; the most dangerous individuals, however, are always courageous. "The city cannot afford excessive courage; it cannot dispense with excessive moderation." But the binding of "moderation and courage, which the paradigm of weaving [279e] implies, cannot be accomplished politically."

Indeed, we turn from the political to the biological and psychological. Intermarriage (of the moderate and courageous) and education (for common opinion) replace (or augment) pure politics, as the proper form of the paradigm of weaving. "The Stranger's solutuion, then, really amounts to this: the true King assigns the members of courageous families to the city's army, and the members of moderate families to its lawcourts." Benardete doesn't here mention it but in this manner the City itself, the institutions of the city itself, are forced to mimic the Guardians we meet in the Republic; they are fierce to enemies but gentle towards friends. Benardete then observes that "the Stranger does not even hint at which families are to supply the rhetoricians of the city." Or which family supplies the weavers or true Kings.

Benardete fills the penultimate paragraph with observations on how it is very difficult to get the members of the different families (courageous and moderate) to love each other. One can convince them that the `mixed' marriages are best but one cannot make a married couple into lover and beloved by education alone. "Insofar as Eros is love of the beautiful, and not identical with sexual desire, these most suitable marriages are against the grain of Eros." Each `family' sees itself only as beautiful. But the city requires that each family marry its non-beautiful other. "And, likewise, since the divine bond of the city consists of opinions about the beautiful, just and good, which are for the wise statesman nothing but prescriptions for the health of the city, the city through the law incorporates in its ruling families as little satisfaction of the requirements of pure mind as of the needs of Eros." Thus the laws of the city satisfy neither the mind nor the eros of citizens. ...But the city is healthy; and the citizens bodies are protected and sated.

"The law, said the Stranger, is like a stupid and willful human being. We now know what this means. The law combines the vice of moderation with the vice of courage and thus passes itself off as the perfect weaving into the web of justice of the beautiful with the beautiful. But the true synergy of mind and Eros in soul was the impure dialectics of Socrates, and Socrates is about to go on trial." By `impure' dialectics Benardete means a dialectic that is a mixture of moderation and courage. The philosopher Socrates is about to die so the city can live. The city, or, if you prefer, its laws, are an inverted philosopher. The city and its laws are stupid and willful, while the philosopher is both moderate and courageous. ...In any city Socrates would die.

Mi másért vettem meg tavaly ezt a könyvet, mint az első harmadában elmesélt apokalipszis-mítoszért. A többi része is érdekes, de mítoszmesélésben még mindig Platón a legmenőbb. Még akkor is jól csinálja, ha rosszul csinálja.

Tavaly szeptemberben ugyanis apokalipszistörténetekről hallgattam előadást a Trefort-kertben,és ámulva-bámulva tudtam meg, hogy a visszafelé forgó idő ötletét vagy Platón találta ki, vagy ő jegyezte le először. Mint a Hyperionban, csak itt az egész emberiségre érvényes az, hogy egyszer csak elkezd visszafelé élni, egyre fiatalodni, majd eltűnni– sőt, még az összes halott is visszatér a földből, szép sorban, amíg el nem fogynak.

Részletes értékelésem a blogon:
https://gyujtogeto-alkoto.blog.hu/202...

This E-book (a Benjamin Jowett translation) is the last and final Platonic dialogue I’ve read. Jowett says that the Statesman has little of the grace, beauty and dramatic power of Plato’s earlier dialogues, but it is still “the highest and most ideal conception of politics in Plato’s writing.” The ruler is the True Herdsman, the King of Man. Or, rather, the Ruler is God, not man. He alone has knowledge. It is the science of pure knowledge. It is a royal science, the science of rule or command.

Jowett argues elsewhere that Plato has to be read as a whole. Any particular dialogue sits within a broader context of the Platonic corpus, each emphasizing one or more aspects. The Statesman can be read with that perspective in mind. The Republic describes the forms of government, with that led by the Philosopher-King as the best; rule by the many, democracy, is the worst. The Laws provide the specifics about how the Republic is to be run. The Statesman fills out this picture. This dialogue highlights the role of the philosopher-king, which is much along the line of what Jowett puts forward.

Many interpret Plato’s philosopher-king notion in a secularized – philosophical, not theological – sense. One commentator writes that the philosopher-king possesses this “special knowledge of how to rule justly and well” and that he has “the best interests of the citizen at heart.” Who could disagree with that? But what, for Plato, is “knowledge about” or, rather, what is “special knowledge” about? And what is the “best interests” of the citizens? In the dialogues, “To know” is not to know our material world. Rather, it’s to know a divine world or, for Jowett and the Neoplatonists, it’s the world of God. The job of the polity, and the philosopher-king in particular, is to lead the citizenry toward this more perfect world. It is the kingdom of God on Earth. This, not bodily well-being, is the “best interest” of the citizen.

In the Statesman, there is this odd interlude where Plato describes the age of Chronos. This is a time when the sun set on the east and rose in the west. It was an age where time was reversed. It was a Golden Age where there are no human needs. What is Plato doing here? He is separating humans from their body and the laws of cause and effect. This is the realm of the spirit. He has liberated human form from all those animal passions that make humans so imperfect. They have no place in the Age of Chronos. There, the spirit of humans is perfect and free. When humans stray from God in Plato’s cyclic world, their needs come back and they are ruled by humans who think they are God. It is an age that demands, again, a divine intercession, a savior who returns to this imperfect world and to lead humans back to God. This notion of earthly cycles is similar to the Buddhist avatar who repeatedly makes his appearance in cyclic time to lead humans back to their divine essence. This is Plato’s statesman. This is Jesus. This is the Christian rapture.

As a final note, the Socratic-Platonic dialogue is famed as a methodology for truth and knowledge but it is nothing of the sort. This dialogue is about Plato using lackeys to ask vapid questions that move the dialogue along and give Plato what he needs, including an affirmation about the wisdom of Plato’s metaphysical agenda and its everlasting Neverworld. Truth is about the Divine and Reason-Dialogue is how you get there.

The Statesman by Plato

Please give my Amazon review a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-re...

This is another book I read for Online Great Books. Again, if it wasn't for the seminar discussion after reading the book, I would have been lost in left field.

This is the second of a planned series of three books - Sophist, Statemen, and Philosopher. "Philosopher" never got written. Why Philosopher was not written is fodder for speculation. This dialogue also features the visiting philosopher who interacts with "Young Socrates," who is a young friend of Socrates. Socrates has only a few lines at the beginning of the dialogue.

The visiting philosopher again applies the taxonomic approach to identifying what makes for a statesman. The visiting philosopher concludes:

"VISITOR: Then let us say that this marks the completion of the fabric which is the product of the art of statesmanship: the weaving together, with regular intertwining, of the dispositions of brave and moderate people—when the expertise belonging to the king brings their life together in [c] agreement and friendship and makes it common between them, completing [311c] the most magnificent and best of all fabrics and covering with it all the other inhabitants of cities, both slave and free; and holds them together with this twining and rules and directs without, so far as it belongs to a city to be happy, falling short of that in any respect.

Plato. Plato: Complete Works (p. 402). Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. Kindle Edition.

Well, gosh, that's nice, but a little bit impossible to achieve in our fallen world.

The dialogue itself is not easy to follow since it seems to jump tracks periodically. However, the reader does get a nice discussion of the various forms of government - monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy and their distorted counterparts. This is a review of Plato's Republic and a preview of some of Aristotle's writings.

264e - Zoopolitikon aslinda burada geciyor.

267d - Siyaset - Seyiscilik arasi iliski Karsilastirmahttps://nisanyansozluk.com/?k=Siyaset

269c - Deizm

271c - Topraktan dogma hikayesiyle zamanin geriye dogru akmasi hikayesini birlestiriyor. Zaman tersten geciyor, oluler canlanip, genclesip, yok oluyorlar. Boylece topraktan dogmus oluyorlar.

272a - Acikca cennet efsanesi. Ama Kronos'un hukmettigi zamanlar olarak anlatiliyor. 271c'deki durumla birlestirilmis.

294c - Yasalari kisiliklestirip cahil ve inatci yoneticilere benzetiyor. Uzerinde dusunulmeli. Neden keyfimiz degisiyor? Neden yasa keyfimize engel olunca cahil ve inatci kisiler gibi davraniyor.

295a - Kanunlarin varligini kisiye gore kural konulmasinin zorlugu oldugunu soyluyor.

295e - Hekim tatile cikiyor, o sirada hastanin yapmasi gerekenleri yazili veriyor. Sonra tatilden erken donuyor ve mesela mevsim degisikligi vs sebebiyle daha once soylediklerini geri aliyor. Bu durumda hasta daha onceki yazili receteyi one surerek yeni receteye karsi cikarsa ne olur? Bu oykuyle kanunlar arasinda bag kuruyor.

298 - 299 - Iki pasaj da bir olcudegunumuzun durumunu, bir olcude de gelecegimizi (AI) anlatiyor. Tastan sutunlar ve mermer levhalar uzerine kurallari yaziyorlar. Gorev suresi belli, kurayla ya da secimle yapiyorlar ve mahkemeler onlari yargiliyor. Arada Genc Sokrates bu duruma iliskin negatif cumleler soyluyor. Ama sonra justify etmeden hava donuyor ve kanunlar olmasi gereken seyler haline geliyor.

303 a-b - Kanunsuz yonetimi ayiriyor boylece tek, bazive hep'ten 6 yonetim cikariyor. Monarsi, Tiran / Aristokrasi, Oligarsi / Iyi demokrasi, kotu demokrasi. Kanunlara uyulursa en iyisi monarsi diyor, kanunlara uyulmazsa en iyisi demokrasi diyor.

308 - 309 - 310 Enerjiklik ve itidal arasinda bir dengeyi yaratan devlet adamindan bahsediyor.

Thaitetos ile bilgi edinimi başlayıp, Sofist ile varlık üzerine devam eden, yine Sofist’te filozof ve sofist ayrımını yaptıktan sonra, devlet yönetimi üzerine önermelerde bulunan diyalog bütününde son halkadır. Platon bir kez daha Sofist’te karşımıza çıkan Elealı Yabancı’nın tümevarım tekniğine dayanarak, yönetim kavramını inceleyecek, farklı bölümlere ayıracak ve insanlar için en optimal yönetimin arayışına girişecektir. Bu yönetim arayışında daha önce Sofist’te de karşımıza çıkan kavramların mutlaklığından değil, mutlağa giderken uzaklaştıkları ölçü veya sabit norm, arayışın esası olacaktır. Sonuçta erdem bile kendi içerisinde bir kavga barındırır, bu nedenle erdem de, ahlak da, kanun da tek başına bir yönetime, arayışı içersinde olduğu ve yönetim için en üst sanat olarak sunduğu krallık sanatına veya krallık bilimine karşılık gelmez.

Yabancı’nın tümevarımını kurabilmek için, temelleri Devlet Adamı’nın sanatının nasıl bir sanat olduğunu anlayarak atabiliriz. Devlet Adamı’nın sanatı bedene değil, akla dayanan, emreden değil kural koyan, özgün kararlar alan ve yöneten bir sanattır. Cansızları değil canlıları, ve canlılar arasından da insanları yöneten bir sanattır Devlet Adamı’nınki. Bir sonraki bölümde eski efsanelerden yararlanarak Kronos’un Altın Çağı’nı ve Zeus’un demir çağını anlatacak, tanrıların yönetimi ile insanların erişmek istediği yönetim arasında bir bağlantı kurma çabasına girişecektir. Efsanelerin sonunda her ne kadar insanlık için mükemmel bir dünya örneği görsek de (Özellikle insanların Kronos tarafından yetiştirildiği ve sürekli gözetilip bakıldığı Altın Çağ’da), insanlık olarak düşebileceğimiz çok büyük bir hata ile yüzyüze geliriz, devlet adamı veya kraldan Kronos’a atanan bu nitelikleri beklememiz imkansızdır, kralın işi insanları yetiştirmek, beslemek ve gözetmek değil, onların aralarında oluşabilecek çıkar çatışmalarını engelleyecek siyasetin teminidir. Bir diğer önemli fark da burada ortaya çıkar ki, insanlık bir çobanın güdeceği bir sürü değil, kendi rızasıyla siyasi bir yönetim altında bulunan bir topluluktur. Bu noktada tiranlık ve krallığın da ayrımı yapılmış olur. Kabul edileceği gibi, Kronos gibi ilahi bir varlık ile herhangi bir insan karşılaştırılamaz, meşrutiyetini yönetilenlerin rızası ve hukuk temellerine dayandırmayan bir yönetim sadece ilahi varlıklara atfedilebilir, bir insanın böyle bir konumda olması sadece tiranlık ve zorbalıkla sonuçlanabilir.

Platon bu noktada üç farklı yönetim şeklini ortaya koyacaktır,

i.meşruiyetini yasa veya genel rızaya dayandırmayan, bilgeliği ile öne çıkan filozof kral;
ii.toplumun rızasıyla egemenliği elde eden ve yasaları her şeyin üstünde Kabul eden yönetim ve
iii.üçüncü olarak da Sofistler ve taklitçilerin yönetimleri.

Platon bunlardan sadece ikincisi ile doğru bir yönetim olacağını kabul edecektir, zira filozof kral yönetimi en ideal olmakla beraber imkansız, Sofist ve taklitçilerin yönetimi ise şiddetle karşı çıkılması gereken, bozuk bir sistemlerdir.

292e “Tüm Yunanlılar arasında bırak on bin kişi arasında kral bulmayı, satranç ustası bile bulmak zordur.”

301e “O halde gerçekten de kentlerde bir arı kovanından çıkar gibi doğuştan üstün ruh ve bedene sahip bir kral olmadığı için, en doğru devletin yolundan giderek kanunlar yazmak için bir araya gelmeliyiz.”

Platon diyalogu burada en olgun seviyesine taşır ve devlet adamını, devlet işleri içerisinde yer alır gözüken tüm diğer sanatlardan ayırmak ister. Bunun için devlet adamı ile en yakın sanatı dokuma ile özdeşleştirecektir. Ancak bu dokumacılık sanatını tamamlamadan önce liyakat, kanun ve rıza kavramlarını öne süreceği yönetim şekilleri ile birleştirme yoluna gidecektir. Bu yönetim şekillerini üzerine kurmamız gereken Zemin ise, genel istencin ikna edildiği kanunların olduğu yerdedir, böylece yönetim şekillerini bu kanunlara uyanlar ve uymayanlar olarak ikiye ayırabiliriz,
Tek kişinin kanunlara uyarak ve toplumun istenciyle egemenliğe sahip olduğu yönetim monarşi, tek kişi yönetiminin bu şartlara mukabil hali de tiranlık; birkaç kişinin veya küçük bir grubun doğru yönetimi aristokrasi, kötüye kullanıldığı hali oligarşi, çoğunluğun yönetimi ise demokrasi olur. (Demokrasilerde durumun diğer yönetimlerden farklı olduğu, farklı bir isim vermenin zor olduğunu söyleyecektir Yabancı)

Hukuk ve liyakate saygı açısından, adil ve yönetime ehil bir monark, esas ölçüt olarak alınan kanunlara uygunluk söz konusu iken tirana göre üstündür. Ve kanunlara bağlı kalındığı sürece en iyi yönetim bu durumda monarşi olacak, aynı şartlarda en etkisiz yönetim de demokrasi olacaktır. Durumun tersi söz konusuyken, en iyi yönetim demokrasi haline gelir. Sonuçta, kural ve yasa tanımaz bir tiranın halkına verebileceği zarar, birden fazla sesin olduğu ve muhalif güçlerin oluşabileceği diğer yönetim şekillerinde olacağından çok daha yüksektir.

303a “Diğer yönetim şekillerinin hepsi kanunsuz ve düzensiz ise, yaşanacak rejim demokrasidir.”

Toplumsal mühendislik fikrinin temelleri olduğuna inandığım dokumacılık sanatı ve devlet adamlığının özdeşleştirilmesi buradan sonra devam edecek, Yabancı bunun için önce erdemler içerisinde oluşabilecek çatışmaları açıklayacaktır. Cesaret de, ölçülülük de bir erdem olmakla beraber, bir arada olmalarının zorluğundan kaynaklı her zaman savaş içerisinde olacak, ve genel olarak insanlarda bu erdemlerden biri galip çıkacak ve Ruhuna tek bir özellik olarak yansıyacaktır. Fazla cesur bir yönetici veya yöneticilerin devleti her zaman savaştan savaşa yoracağı ve en sonunda yok olmaya mahkum bırakacağı, fazla ölçülü ve uysal yöneticilerin de devleti uzun vadede uyuşuk ve disiplinsiz kılacağı, rakip komşuların esareti altına sürükleyeceğini savunur. Machiavelli’nin bir yöneticide hem bir aslanın cesareti, hem de bir tilkinin bilgeliği olması gerektiğini savunması gibi, Yabancı da burada bu iki erdemin, bu yazının başında dile getirdiğim sabit norm ölçüsüne dayandığı, ne çok enerjik, ne de fazla durgun bir kişiliği oluşturacak şekilde birleşmesi gerektiğini savunur. İşin toplumsal mühendislik tarafı da, günümüz politik kültüründe kulağa oldukça radikal gelen bir birliktelik müdahalesi ile kurulmaktadır. Devlet bir sanat olarak burada son derece faydacı ve pragmatik bir müdahale aracı olarak devreye sokulmakla, farklı tipte insanların bir araya gelmesini sağlayarak, farklı yaklaşımlar arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar bu organik birleşme ile devlet adamı tarafından dokunacak ve ölçülü erdemler taşıyan nesillerin yolu açılacaktır.

Özellikle Hobbes ve Machiavelli okumalarımı tekrarlamaya iten, Platon’un özellikle Devlet’I yazıkdan sonra değişim göstermiş siyasi yaklaşımları hakkında çokça fikir edinmemi sağlamış bir eserdi.

The Statesman forms an unmissable cornerstone in the political triad of Plato, next to the Republic and the Laws. Its elaboration of the "ship of state" metaphor improves upon the Republic. It continues the discussion around the philosophy of concepts started in the Sophist. The two essays are thematically and historically connected, for the Statesman supposedly takes place immediately after the Sophist. The Statesman combines conceptual analysis with political philosophy.

Here, Plato makes a forceful case for monarchical rule as a type of "epistocracy" where the wisest rule even under conditions of radical uncertainty. The argumentative style of Plato's project is as fascinating as its conceptual clarity and argumentative rigour are impressive. Its complex examination of the nature of good governance under less-than-ideal assumptions is essential Plato, and it manages to partially answer the objection of some to the Republic that Platonic rule of the philosopher king is too idealistic and therefore rare/unworkable in practice. In many ways, the late Plato is less of an ideal theorist than the late Plato, although not wholly so. At any rate, his defence of the ideal model of the philosopher king remains as firm - and perhaps as convincing - as ever. For these reasons, the essay is an absolutely essential piece in the Platonic puzzle. It can easily be read, for example in a school course, as an optional companion piece to the Republic.

A truly neglected political treatise, Plato explores further the themes of expertise and ruling, the moral psychology of the citizen and the defects of political systems that we take for granted. If one is really interested in themes of the Republic with inventive arguments favoring the expert statesman, then I very thoroughly recommend this book.

The beginning of this dialogue was pretty boring but once they got into discussing the three types of constitutions; rule by one, few, and many; the dialogue was much more interesting. From this discussion, we learn that the beneficent dictator is the best ruler and also that Plato is not a fan of democracy as it is “capable of nothing of importance either for good or for bad” (348). However, it is the best government if the people are not law abiding since it does the least damage.

I just love this man. Almost read all the dialogues, and I’ll return to him, I’m sure, many times. Wonderful.

The continuation of the dialog with strangers regarding the qualification of the statesman. What arts and abilities he must have. The dialog was more direct than the previous book, sophist.

This has to be the most pretentious thing I’ve ever logged on here. This was bad. Baaaaddd!!!! Inspired some cool conversations though

3 Stars

3 stars more for my lack of understanding than for what is there. Definitely one I need to return to to understand more of what he wants to convey.

In fact, the majority of the book is too confusing as he was trying to justify every single details in his philosophy on the statesman concept using many examples to the extent I felt lost. But still it is a very important contribution on his realistic track after the big fallacies of the book (the republic).

I was very disappointed that the new Brann/Kalkavage/Salem translation of the Statesman did not arrive in time for me to read it for my SJC Alumni Seminar this weekend, especially after having just read their Sophist translation. I found this translation to be much less clear and readable, which definitely affected my rating of the book...
I was also comparatively unimpressed with the first half of the dialogue itself. Thankfully, over the course of our Seminar, several questions were raised which were interesting enough to make me reconsider the dialogue as a whole. In what way is the sophist the wolf to the philosopher's dog? Are the philosopher, the statesman and the sophist actually two rather than three, as the stranger claims? What is the stranger (he does not appear to fit as either a philosopher or a sophist, in spite of bearing a certain resemblance to both)?
Additionally, since both the statesman and the philosopher are concerned with "weaving everything together in the most correct way", I have been trying to tease out the implications of them being the same person, just as the sophist is the image of each. Predictably, this has brought me back to the Republic, wherein the exploration of justice in the city is a way of exploring justice in the soul. Accordingly, if the true statesman is an expert at "weaving together the dispositions of courageous and moderate people", can we not say that the philosopher should be able to weave together the courageous and moderate dispositions within himself, favoring neither above the other and working to promote both?

Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem's translation of Plato's Statesman is a very useful resource that I highly recommend to all serious students of Plato. The same trio collaborated on Plato's Phaedo, which is also very fine. The translation itself is very good: it is clear, and fairly literal—an absolute necessity for the proper interpretation of whom Nietzsche called "the most beautiful growth of antiquity" (Beyond Good and Evil, "Preface"). No translation is perfect, however, and so I recommend using this one in conjunction with an even more literal one, that of Seth Benardete. In addition to the translation, this edition by Brann, Kalkavage and Salem includes a very useful introduction, glossary, essay and two appendices (a brief—but instructive—illustration of the art of weaving, and a longer discussion of the many divisions from the dialogue). Of these additional features, the essay in particular has many illuminating observations.

The first two thirds of this dialogue are tedious to a ridiculous extreme.

The last third more than makes up for it. Reading Plato can be like riding a roller coaster, ranging from agreement and enlightenment to pure horror at clearly totalitarian suggestions. The real question is, can a true Statesman ever exist and if not, isn't the idea of one dangerous? The Greek idea that government exists to perfect men is just one I will never agree with.

This dialogue touched a bit on several topics such as dialectic, metaphysics, sociology, and the "royal science" of government. I have a more decentralized, individualistic ideal of the role of government than Plato whose rational pragmatism leads him to favor an oligarchy with strict legal enforcement. Nothing really stood out for me about this dialogue.

Mostly a bunch of senseless division that goes nowhere, and then some interesting political thoughts for a few pages. A mixed bag as a dialogue, but certain excerpts are important for tracing Plato's political development into his older years.

German Edition

Devlet adamını iyi bir şekilde oturtayım derken çok fazla ve farklı analoji yapmaya çalışmış bir kitap. Beni biraz boğdu.

This dialogue is all over the place. It starts as a relentless (and might I add, somewhat pointless) division and classification (a precursor to the Aristotelian desire for classifying the world) of various activities and things to arrive at a definition of the statesman. Inexplicably, this transforms into a creation-myth, which while interesting, felt unnecessary. Within a few pages, this changes into a discourse on the different types of political systems and the role of the legislator, reminding me of Plato's Laws.

The Visitor considers rule by a king who has "expert knowledge" of statesmanship to be the supreme form of political rule. While we may consider this tyranny, The Visitor (and impliedly, Plato) characterises this as a "benevolent despotism". He considers that a democracy can never have this elusive expert knowledge of a single statesman ruling for all.

Here's my issue with this: there's a central assumption running through the dialogue that "expert knowledge" can possibly be acquired, and can be recognised by others. This is obviously problematic. Nobody should trust any political leader who tells them that they have "expert knowledge" and want to rule on our behalf because of that knowledge. It is this benevolent despotism that acted as a justification for colonisation as a civilising mission in the 18th century. Even if we were to accept that an expert knowledge exists, who recognises it to grant this ruler legitimacy? Surely not the ruler themselves. Which is why a democracy is obviously a more legitimate form of government, arguments on what may be hypothetically better aside.

Even Plato recognises the problem of according legitimacy to such "expert knowledge" by later writing that no actual ruler possesses expert knowledge. Therefore, all current governments must be run by imitators, not very different from sophists, who do not know the right thing to do, but make it appear that they do. Plato recognised that for popular politicians, their image is always more important than their actions.

Statesman is usually classified as a political text, because people largely ignore the classificatory exercise of the first half (perhaps rightly so). However, there are some important perspectives that can be learned from that admittedly tedious beginning.

For example, The Visitor scolds his interlocutor for classifying "humans" and "animals" or "Greeks" and "barbarians" as the binaries of existence. He rightly demonstrates that an animal like a crane may classify the world as "cranes" and "animals" (an early critique of the solipsistic nature of humanity), and people of other countries may consider the Greeks barbarians (the ancient Indians actually did this by calling the Greeks as yavanas (literally Ionians) or mlecchas, which later became the terms used for all foreigners).

The point here is that if our understanding of the world is universal, we must abstract away from ourselves and our communities. We can't divide the world as "us versus them", because then someone else would adopt the same classification and make us, "them". The Visitor's remarks appear, to me, as an important critique of our solipsistic and tribalistic natures.

En väldigt bred dialog, med mycket strunt, men också mycket värdefulla grundkoncept.

Det irriterar mig oerhört att Platon återigen vidmakthåller den spuriösa skillnaden mellan tyranni (regering genom hot om våld) och kungaskap (regering genom balans mellan intressen och strategiska belöningar), och inte behandlar dem som en glidande skala. Inget samtida grekiskt samhälle var fritt från maktmissbruk, eller fritt från konflikter som löstes orättmätigt, genom våld. Platons egna släktingar inkluderade några av de 30 tyranner som installerades av Sparta, och även om han ogillade deras dömande av Sokrates, m.m. så talar han också för deras regim som alternativ till vad som kom efter dem, under några av Sokrates lärjungars regering. Platon förefaller därför hycklande när han hävdar att det finns makt utan våld, i ett samhällsstyre. Särskilt i ljus av att bokens bästa stycke är dess slu*t, där han kommer fram till att kungen verkar genom att spela ut olika grupper med våldskapital och samhällsintressen mot varandra.

Jag gillar denna definition på styrelsehantverket, för den tvingar fram en kungaroll som står bortom direkta konflikter, vilket en bra bevarande ledare behöver göra. Samtidigt skapar den en dynamik - metoderna liknar de som kallades Brinksmanship under kalla kriget; strävan efter att skapa mervärden ur konflikter runt om kring en, genom att aldrig allieras med någon grupp. Dulles hade nog gillat Statesman - eller kanske gjorde, eller inte - jag har aldrig fascinerats speciellt mycket av amerikanska politikers öden och smak.

De långa avsnitt utan innehåll som Platon lägger in i denna gör att jag inte kan rekommendera den. Vad gäller hans neutrala kungaroll, så finns motsvarande beskriven av antropologer och stampolitiker från i stort sett hela världen - ledaren är bara mäktig, så länge hen kan vandra mellan olika läger för att söka stöd. Bateson hade uttryckt det som att bara flexibilitet kan möta komplexitet. Att Platon formulerar detta är viktigt, för det ger en aning om att tanken var okontroversiell nog för Platon att skriva ned (både Aristoteles och nyplatonisterna är överens om att han inte gjorde det med de tankar som kunde orsaka honom problem). Däremot är det inte skäl nog att faktiskt läsa boken.

Jag rekommenderar denna endast för de som vill fördjupa sig i grekisk idéhistoria. Delar av innehållet är viktigt, men det är långt ifrån unikt, och prosan är så pass trögflytande att detta innehåll inte är mödan värt.

A política nobre é a única que pode unir as virtudes da coragem e temperança.
Ler o Político como uma obra isolada de Platão, sem entender o processo da alma de Platão, poderá levar um cidadão muito abaixo de Platão a pensar que pode regular a vida de todos os cidadãos.
Um homem muito abaixo de Platão e tirano quererá regular tudo com a seguinte consequência:

Estrangeiro — Além de tudo isso seria necessário ainda elaborar a seguinte lei: quem quer que procurasse estudar a arte náutica e a ciência da navegação, as regras da saúde, a exatidão da medicina sobre os ventos frios e quentes, fora das leis escritas, tornando-se conhecedor desses assuntos, não poderia, em primeiro lugar, ser chamado médico ou piloto e sim, visionário e sofista fraseador; em seguida, o primeiro que tivesse esse direito acusá-lo-ia diante de um tribunal, denunciando-o como corruptor de jovens a quem induz dedicar-se à ciência náutica e à medicina, arvorando-se eles próprios em senhores dos navios e dos enfermos, sem se orientarem pelas leis. Se ficar provado que ele instrui jovens e velhos no desprezo às leis e à palavra escrita, será punido com os maiores suplícios. Pois não temos o direito de sermos mais sábios que as leis nem de ignorar a medicina, a higiene, a arte náutica e a navegação, sendo permitido, a quem quiser, aprender os preceitos escritos e os costumes tradicionais. Se essas ciências, caro Sócrates, fossem tratadas da maneira por que descrevemos, inclusive a estratégia ou qualquer outro ramo da caça, a pintura ou qualquer outra parte da imitação, a marcenaria ou qualquer outra arte de fabricar móveis, a agricultura ou outra espécie da arte de cultivar plantas; se fossem reguladas por um código a criação de cavalos ou de qualquer outro rebanho, a náutica ou qualquer outra parte da ciência do trabalho, os jogos de damas ou a ciência dos números.

Sócrates: seja pura ou aplicada ao plano, ao sólido, ao movimento — o que aconteceria a tudo isso, conduzido pela sorte, regido pela letra escrita em lugar de orientado pela arte?
É claro que veríamos desaparecer completamente todas as artes, sem esperança alguma de retorno, sufocadas por essa lei que proíbe toda pesquisa. E a vida que já é bastante penosa, tornar-se-ia então totalmente insuportável."